Fork-and-Merge Governance
Evolving Through Experimentation
In the open-source software world, when a group of contributors has a different vision, they can fork the project – copy the code and develop it on a separate path. If their ideas succeed, users might migrate to that fork, or the improvements might later be merged back into the original. Ethereum governance philosophy applies the same principle to social systems: encourage forking of communities and experiments, and allow merging of successful ideas back into the mainstream. Fork-and-merge governance refers to an evolutionary approach where you "create independent institutions that become more important if they succeed," rather than trying to reform or replace existing ones overnight. In simpler terms, let people try alternatives in parallel, and adopt the winners. This concept aligns with both libertarian and collectivist thinking. It's libertarian in that it champions freedom of association and competition – if you don't like how things are run, you can exit and start your own thing (a new DAO, a new chain) rather than being forced to comply. It's collectivist in that it doesn't insist on one monolithic system for everyone; it allows multiple communities with different values to coexist, and perhaps later cooperate or unify if it makes sense. Crucially, Ethereum's infrastructure makes forking feasible. Smart contracts and blockchains allow you to copy not just code but also state (with some effort) and bootstrap a community with tokens and assets. We saw this as far back as the Ethereum Classic split: when a portion of the community strongly opposed the DAO bailout in 2016, they forked off to continue the original chain. That exit option prevented a protracted internal war – each side could pursue its vision, and users had a choice. Ethereum (the fork that reversed the hack) became dominant by community preference, while Ethereum Classic carried on with a minority who valued immutability above all. It was a painful moment, but it set a precedent: the community governs ultimately by consent, and forking is the last-resort tool to enforce that. To make fork-and-merge governance viable long-term, Ethereum culture embraces being "fork-friendly." Vitalik Buterin has argued to "make it easier for users to quickly coordinate on and execute a fork" because this makes the payoff of capturing governance much smaller. If, for example, a malicious actor bought up a majority of governance tokens of a DAO to loot its treasury, a credible response is that the honest minority could fork the DAO's contracts, exclude the attacker's tokens, and re-launch, carrying over the honest balances. This sounds extreme, but it has precedent: in the Steem blockchain takeover of 2020, when a centralized exchange and a wealthy buyer (Justin Sun) colluded to seize control, the community forked the chain into Hive and in that new chain, they blacklisted the attacker's stake. Essentially, they said: "those who voted for the bad governance attack don't get to come along." Hive thrived as an independent community, and the attacker's influence was nullified (his tokens remained in old Steem, which lost much of its user base and value). This is a dramatic example of social slashing via fork – the community collectively defended itself by forking away and penalizing bad actors. The very possibility of such outcomes serves as a strong deterrent to would-be attackers or exploiters in governance. When users can exit en masse, power is fundamentally with the community, not any entrenched minority. Fork-friendly design also encourages governance experiments. Rather than endlessly debating hypotheticals, a community can split off a "sub-DAO" or spin up a new network to try radical governance ideas. For instance, if one group believes in harsher "skin-in-the-game" penalties for voters (slashing tokens of those who vote for harmful proposals), they could implement that on a forked version of the DAO and see how it goes. If it fails, it dies out. If it succeeds (produces a more robust community), others can adopt the model. Ethereum's ecosystem already has many parallel experiments: various Layer-2 networks and sidechains are exploring different governance (Optimism has its two-chamber governance, Arbitrum launched with a large airdrop and unique voting thresholds, etc.). Even independent projects like CityDAO or Krause House (a DAO trying to buy an NBA team) can be seen as forks of the idea of a "city" or a "sports franchise" into a decentralized context. Some will merge back or inspire real-world changes; some will fizzle out. This is healthy and in fact mirrors the scientific process (multiple hypotheses tested) and evolutionary biology (genetic variation leading to selection of the fittest traits). From a Crypto-Luminist perspective, fork-and-merge governance ensures adaptability. It prevents stagnation because there's always an outlet for innovation or dissent: you don't like it, fork it. And it prevents tyranny because no matter how powerful a coalition seems, they can't lock users in if enough people disagree – the dissidents can form their own sovereign community. The merging aspect is equally important: Crypto-Luminism is not about balkanizing into countless islands; it's about recombining the best ideas. Because everything is open-source and on-chain, a great idea in one fork can be imported to another. Sometimes communities even reunite after a fork once differences are reconciled, just as software projects sometimes do. For builders, here's the call to action: design your systems with easy exit and interoperability in mind. That might mean using standard token formats so that user assets can be migrated, or keeping governance rules simple enough that a new instance can be launched if needed. Encourage healthy forking – for example, some DAOs explicitly write into their documentation how a dissatisfied minority can spin off with proportional treasury share (a more structured form of fork known as "ragequit" in Moloch DAO terms). Paradoxically, by making exit easier, you often ensure it's rarely needed because everyone knows they cannot be forced along with something they hate. Also, pay attention to other experiments: collaborate across projects. If another team's fork is succeeding, reach out and see if you can adopt their approach or merge efforts. In decentralized tech, we're not competitors in the traditional sense; we're co-creators of an ecosystem. Fork-and-merge isn't just a governance mechanism – it's a mindset of continuous experimentation and collaboration.