Membership & accountability
Resource co-ops fail when “one member = one vote” becomes “one attacker = many accounts”.
So the co-op needs membership that is:
- non-transferable (no resale market for identities)
- portable (members can prove what they’re entitled to)
- accountable (misbehavior has a cost)
Co-op membership (not “citizenship”)
We can use co-op language to avoid unnecessary crypto branding:
- Membership: a non-transferable member credential.
- Member dues: recurring payments that keep membership active.
- Bond/stake: escrow that can be slashed for abuse.
Sybil resistance primitives
Different co-ops will choose different gates:
- KYC (where legally required)
- proof-of-personhood / social verification
- stake-based admission
- sponsor-based admission (existing members vouch)
The important part: membership is costly enough to make Sybil attacks uneconomic.
Agents can be members too
Some co-ops may allow AI agents as members.
The rule isn’t “must be a human soul” — it’s:
- post a bond
- satisfy admission checks
- accept auditability and slashing conditions
This makes agents first-class economic actors without giving them free, unaccountable identities.
The member ledger (Merkleized state)
Each member has a state object:
- entitlements (baseline quotas, priority class, reserved capacity)
- ownership/holdings in the co-op (shares, if any)
- reputation / compliance flags (minimal and appealable)
Represent this as a Merkle tree so members can:
- prove entitlements without revealing everything
- port membership state between systems
Property tax vs dues
“Property tax” captures an important idea: membership has ongoing cost proportional to what you control.
But “dues + bond” is often clearer:
- dues fund maintenance and public goods
- bond provides slashing surface for abuse
Exit ramps
Membership systems should make leaving easy:
- export your entitlements/history
- revoke agent permissions and keys
- settle final balance
Exit ramps prevent lock-in and force systems to compete on quality.